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INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC IN
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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to analyze responses of public universities to the
introduction of New Public Management (NPM) as the outcome of bal-
ancing between the managerial logics endorsed by NPM and the academic
professional logics. Building on the institutional logics approach, we
develop a framework concerning how universities will achieve compliance
to conflicting claims by strategies like compartmentalization and blending
stipulations of both logics. Empirical results based on a large-scale survey
of 26 universities in eight European countries display how compatibility is
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achieved through highly differentiated adoption of logics that depends on
the task considered. The results reveal that the strength of NPM pressures
strongly affects the adoption of managerial practices within universities
yet has no significant effect on the academic characteristics.
Keywords: Decision-making; institutional logics; higher education
INTRODUCTION
In the last 30 years, there have been changes in the way public policies
manage public services. The idea of such reforms is rooted back to the
1980s with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Namely New Public
Management (NPM) reforms introduced certain policy narratives explain-
ing how public organizations should operate, regardless of the characteris-
tics of their particular sector of activity (Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson,
2000; Ferlie, Musselin, & Andresani, 2008). These narratives emphasize the
importance of economic values and objectives and foresee that public orga-
nizations should be managed like private companies.
However, empirical evidence indicates that the responses of public sector
organizations to NPM reforms are more differentiated than isomorphic
compliance to policy pressures (Ashworth, Boyne, & Delbridge, 2009;
Bovaird & Downe, 2006) and are influenced by organizational characteris-
tics like history, tasks, and position with respect to the state (Lægreid,
Roness, & Rubecksen, 2007). Moreover, not only do responses vary
between organizations, but compliance is selective with respect to different
organizational features (Andrews, 2011).
Responses are particularly complex in sectors such as education and
healthcare, which are characterized by resilient professional cultures which
establish different modes of managing such organizations with respect to the
private sector (Leicht & Fennell, 2008; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury,
2012). When public policies are coercive in implementing NPM, this would
risk generating conflict and jeopardizing key elements of the professional cul-
ture, like the importance of trust and the autonomy of professionals, which is
considered central to the performance of these organizations (Adler, 2008).
In those cases, resistance from the organization is expected (Townley, 1997).
In this paper, we aim to investigate responses to the introduction of
NPM policies in the case of public universities in Europe. Our analysis
builds on the theoretical perspective of institutional logics. In this context,
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the aim of this paper is to investigate how the interaction between manage-
rial and academic logic shapes responses from European public universities
to NPM pressures. We hypothesize that rather than selecting one compet-
ing logic, universities are likely to develop more differentiated strategies to
achieve some level of compatibility and to avoid conflict, adopting the core
practices of the managerial logic, while keeping some central features of the
academic logic and resorting to compromise in case of conflict.
For this aim, we investigate the adoption of two sets of practices, related
respectively to the managerial and academic logic. The introduction of an orga-
nizational hierarchy and rule system represents two key stipulations of manage-
rial logic (Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000), while collegial decision-making
and the participation of academics in decision-making are two core features of
the academic logic. Accordingly, we expect that the considered cases, when sub-
ject to NPM pressures, will introduce hierarchy and rule systems, but try at the
same time to maintain collegial decision-making and academic participations
especially for those tasks considered central to the academic logic, such as the
management of teaching and research. When stipulations of the two logics con-
flict on the same tasks, universities are expected to achieve some level of com-
patibility by compromising: for example, top-hierarchical positions might be
occupied by academic leaders holding also professional authority, while the
consultation and involvement of academics in decisions could be maintained
also within a hierarchical and rule-based structure.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, we provide
a more nuanced understanding of the public organization’s response to
NPM pressures quantitatively, particularly when the field is characterized
by the presence of a strong professional culture. On the other hand, these
results hint at the possibility that the introduction of managerial practices
does not necessarily lead to the dysfunctional outcomes feared by some
authors, like jeopardizing trust and demotivation of employees
(Diefenbach, 2009). It suggests that the presence of a strong academic cul-
ture might allow universities to be selective in adopting managerial prac-
tices, while keeping some central elements of the academic logic which are
functional to the characteristics of their activities.
INSTITUTION LOGICS AND RESPONSES TO
INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES
Institutional logics are socially constructed, historical patterns of assump-
tions, values, beliefs, rules and material practices by which individuals
171Decision-Making Power and Institutional Logic in Higher Education Institutions
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produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space,
and provide meaning to their social reality (Thorton & Ocasio, 1999,
p. 804). Logics provide cognitive and practical templates to organizations
on how to perform certain tasks. Research has provided extensive evidence
that many organizational fields are characterized by lasting institutional
pluralism, that is, by the enduring presence of legitimate alternative logics
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Kraatz & Block, 2008).
Earlier institutional studies assumed that organizations would comply
with one single logic and resist the other (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993).
Namely, it was argued that blending institutional logics would jeopardize
the identity of the organization, lead to conflicts at the level of activities,
and generate uncertainty and ambiguity for the employees. Professional
organizations would then have to decide whether to resist NPM pressures
or become managerially orientated. In turn, decoupling would be an alter-
native strategy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), which is risky when pluralism is
long lasting, as audiences over time may become aware of the purely ritual
character of compliance.
Recent research has shown that both blending and hybridity are more
widespread than assumed, and that organizations can be intentional and
goal-oriented in this process (Greenwood, Diaz, Li, & Lorente, 2009).
Responses can be broadly classified into two groups (Greenwood,
Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011). On the one hand, struc-
tural responses aim to reduce tensions by creating subunits following differ-
ent logics, for example, a technical department with a public-service
mission and a sales department with a marketing mission (Jarzabkowski,
2004). Compartmentalization implies the adoption of intact groups of prac-
tices from individual logics (Pache & Santos, 2013). For instance, universi-
ties might adopt managerial practices for management tasks, while keeping
academic practices for tasks more directly related to teaching and research.
On the other hand, blending and compromising responses have been identi-
fied, where organizations combine elements of different logics by exploiting
their compatibility (Jay, 2013) and, thereby, develop original sets of prac-
tices. For instance, when pressured by NPM to introduce a stronger hier-
archical structure, universities might introduce elements of it, but soften it
through participative arrangements and by avoiding any overt use of
power. While managerial and professional logics might be incompatible at
the level of general principles and values, it is possible that at the level of
specific tasks, compatibility is achieved through case-by-case solutions.
Further, it has been highlighted that organizations can be highly strategic
in managing their legitimacy and, therefore, be selective in coupling with
institutional logics (Pache & Santos, 2013). This means that, strategically,
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organizations will respond to a conflict between the logics by selectively
complying with those stipulations considered central by each individual
logic, in order to enhance legitimacy towards audiences.
Beyond the simple opposition between managerial and professional
logics, this discussion first suggests that to understand how public organiza-
tions cope with pluralism, a highly differentiated analysis of the content of
each logic and of the centrality of the different practices is needed. Second,
it suggests that public organizations are more likely to seek compatibility
through strategies like compartmentalization and blending, than to overtly
oppose managerial logics, as this strategy would allow conflicting legiti-
macy claims to be better managed.
Achieving Compatibility
In our empirical investigation the focus is on two central stipulations of the
managerial logic, that is, the introduction of hierarchy and rationality
(Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000), and two central stipulations of the
academic logic, that is, decision-making by consensus (collegiality) and par-
ticipation of individual academics to decision-making. A straightforward
selective coupling argument would lead to the expectation that, in order to
be compliant with both managerial and academic logic, universities would
introduce hierarchy and rationality, while keeping at the same time collegi-
ality and participation. However, things are not so simple, as these princi-
ples might contradict each other and, therefore, organizations are obliged
to choose or to compromise. Therefore, a more careful analysis is required.
In the managerial logic, organizational hierarchy is structural and is based
on the definition of layers of leaders and followers (de Boer, Enders, &
Leisyte, 2007); central control and vertical coordination with leaders defin-
ing goals and strategies and subordinates implementing them. Hierarchy
should be enforced through formalized assignments of responsibilities and
the definition of formal decision-making procedures. These principles
would contradict an academic conception of hierarchy, which is based on
professional authority, and where horizontal coordination prevails (hence
rectors and deans are considered primus inter pares).
We suggest two approaches to limit conflicts in the introduction of a
managerial hierarchical structure: on the one hand, focusing on those
organizational activities which are not core in the academic understanding
of a university, like administrative tasks, logistics, and resourcing. On the
other hand, for those activities which are core to academia, like teaching
and research, universities might reduce the cognitive distance between
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management and individual academics by empowering faculty leaders
rather than university leaders; further, even within a hierarchical structure,
they might reduce the power asymmetry by foreseeing consultation and
participation of academics to decision-making and by preferring the con-
struction of consensus against the overt use of hierarchical power.
In terms of rationality, the managerial logic endorses a conception where
human action should be goal-oriented and based on the systematic evalua-
tion of its consequences, emphasizing efficiency and precise measurement of
outcomes as key values. In formal and practical terms, it draws on the adop-
tion of planning instruments in decision-making and the diffusion of routines
as tools to solve day-to-day problems in a predefined way (Brunsson &
Sahlin-Andersson, 2000; Townley, 2002). Therefore, rationality is a complex
and multi-layered concept which includes both an interpretive framework on
the reality (theoretical rationality), a set of values which should direct the
action (substantive rationality), and recipes on how to deal with day-to-day
problems (practical rationality; Kalberg, 1980; Townley, 2002).
These distinctions allow for a more precise identification of points of
conflict and elements of compatibility with the academic logics. Namely,
the academic logic is not necessarily contrary to the adoption of simple
rules in order to perform some tasks, like the repartition of the budget or
the execution of managerial tasks. Stronger resistance from organizations is
expected when rule systems involve judgments by the organizational leader-
ship concerning the quality of academics, respectively, an understanding
that the goal of a university should be to become more efficient.
Collegiality, as a core component of the academic logic, emphasizes the
autonomy of professionals and their equal value, as well as a world where
action should be driven by academic values and by the search for novelty,
related to the unpredictability of scientific inquiry. In formal and practical
terms, it emphasizes decision-making based on consensus. Academics who
hold prestigious positions are often involved in the governance of the univer-
sities’ tasks related to teaching and research, therefore academic merit usually
has influence on university politics (Bergquist, 1992). Similarly, participation
is about the involvement of academics and their power in the decision-making
process and design of control instruments (Adler & Borys, 1996). On the one
hand, such participatory arrangements are likely to be more acceptable in
terms of the characteristics of academic work; on the other hand, rule systems
co-shaped with professionals will enjoy a higher level of legitimacy and will
meet less opposition and thus be more effective (Courpasson, 2000) (Fig. 1).
Accordingly, when hierarchy is introduced, compliance or compromise
will depend on whether the task in question is a core or a non-core academic
174 S. KUBRA CANHILAL ET AL.
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task. The expected behavior is that for the core academic tasks there will be
a compromise, and in our case participation will be kept in tandem with a
reduction of the cognitive distance between the various organizational subu-
nits. Concerning rationality, we predict that substantive rationality will meet
more resistance because it is connected to value, therefore compromise is
needed to balance between the two logics by keeping the participation of
individual academics to the creation of the evaluation tools.
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS: CASE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION
Public universities in Europe can be considered as a prototypical case of
organizations subject to conflicting stipulations from a professional logic and
(a)
(b)
Rationality
Hierarchy
Non-core
academic tasks
Core academic
tasks
Compromise Keep
participation
Decrease
cognitive and
social distance
Low
hierarchy
Compliance
High
hierarchy
Formal No resistance
Little
resistance
Resistance
Keep
participation Less
rationality
More
rationality
Practical
Substantive
Fig. 1. Interaction of NPM with Hierarchy and Rationality. Source: Prepared by
the Authors.
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from a managerial logic (Albert & Whetten, 1985). On the one hand, they
were traditionally considered to be highly specific organizations, character-
ized by loose coupling (Weick, 1976) and the dominance of the profession
(Mintzberg, 1979). The professional logic of academia emphasizes the speci-
fic nature of research activities, which cannot be controlled from the outside,
and accordingly provides a rationale for autonomy of research and the lack
of central control (Musselin, 2007). Moreover, it considers scientific disci-
plines to be the central cognitive and social structure of academia (Becher,
1994) through which professional careers are managed, and accordingly,
results into decentralized universities (Becher & Trowler, 2001; Clark, 1983).
Finally, it considers peer-to-peer coordination and collegial decisions based
on consensus and formal equality of academics, to be central components of
the decision-making process (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).
On the other hand, in the past three decades universities in Europe have
increasingly been subject to pressures to become similar to other organiza-
tions, to introduce a formal organizational structure, and to become “rational
organizations” with well-defined goals and strategies (Ramirez, 2009).
Normative pressures to align with the corporate model are part of a broader
process of diffusion of a global organizational template, where all organiza-
tions compete worldwide, while characteristics related to individual sectors
and countries should disappear (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997).
While in the United States this process began before1960s, in Europe pub-
lic universities were protected from managerial pressures by an alliance
between the State and the profession, built on an understanding that public
organizations in general, and universities in particular, had different goals
and ways of functioning when compared to companies (Ramirez &
Christensen, 2013). Competition between universities has been a fact in the
American ecology of higher education for a very long time. Universities are
engaged in raiding faculty from other universities and in shielding themselves
from other university efforts to seduce their faculty. External offers are a
mechanism through which one may improve one’s salary. On the other
hand, in the European context, the institutional environment of European
universities profoundly changed in the 1980s with the introduction of NPM
narratives in public policies (Ferlie et al., 2008; Paradeise, Reale, Bleiklie, &
Ferlie, 2009), which promoted an understanding that public organizations
should also be managed like private companies, and specifically, develop a
clear identity and introduce hierarchy and rationality in their structure
(Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). Normative pressures were also
accompanied by coercive interventions from the State and thus became
more forceful, albeit with significant differences across countries in terms of
176 S. KUBRA CANHILAL ET AL.
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the pace and extent of reforms (de Boer, Enders, & Schimank, 2007;
Paradeise et al., 2009). Policies were implemented through regulatory
changes, like granting more autonomy to universities, the introduction of
market arrangements in funding (Teixeira, Jongbloed, Dill, & Amaral,
2004), and the diffusion of evaluation systems at the national level (Whitley
& Glaser, 2007).
Table 1 displays how the academic and managerial logic provide widely
different stipulations on how universities should be managed (Thornton &
Ocasio, 1999). The managerial logic conceives universities as corporate
actors oriented towards market competition and that performance should
be managed through a well-defined hierarchy, where authority rests on
the top management and it is legitimized by hierarchical relationship. The
managerial logic foresees the centralization of decisions and their imple-
mentation through command and rule systems guiding employees in
their activities. In contrast, the academic logic considers a university as a
“community of scholars,” whose main mission is to produce scholarly
knowledge and maintain its reputation among peers. Authority is based on
professional seniority and academic reputation, whereas decisions should
be taken by consensus, and autonomy of academics should be guaranteed.
Table 1. Dimensions of the Academics and Managerial Logics.a
Managerial Academic
Economic
system
Performance-based Membership-based
Sources of
identity
University as a corporate organization University as professional
organizations
Sources of
legitimacy
Hierarchical position Scholarly reputation
Sources of
authority
Top management Academic profession
Basis of
mission
Increase organizational performance Produce scholarly knowledge
Basis of
attention
Performance measures Peers judgment
Basis of
strategy
Positioning in market niches Constructing university
reputation
Logic of
investment
Focus on activities where the university
enjoys a competitive advantage
Provide large freedom of research
and teaching to the professorial
body
Governance
mechanism
Managerial decisions by top-hierarchy Collegial principle
aBased on the dimensions of Thornton and Ocasio (1999).
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Since the introduction of NPM reforms in Europe, it has been highly
contested whether public policies would be able to transform universities
into corporate organizations, with some scholars arguing that because of
the characteristics of their activities and structural conditions related to the
profession, transforming universities into organizational actors was not
possible, and if so, it would be highly dysfunctional (Whitley, 2008).
Empirical evidence reveals a complex situation as well. On the one hand,
policy pressures are changing European universities from being admini-
strated organizations towards being managed organizations, with stronger
central leadership and strategic capability (Kru¨cken, Kosmu¨tzky, & Torka,
2007), where principles of efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and central strategic
control are introduced (Christopher & Leung, 2015; de Boer, Enders, &
Leisyte, 2007; Enders, Kehm, & Schimank, 2015; Kogan, Bauer, Bleiklie, &
Henkel, 2006). On the other hand, there is a great deal of variation in this
process (Sahlin, 2012), and changes are rather gradual and incremental
(Musselin, 2007). The so-called World Class Universities have maintained
traditional characteristics: they are internally decentralized, governance is co-
shared between the faculty and the administration, and a high level of socia-
lization among academics is maintained (Paradeise & Thoenig, 2011).
Instead, universities grasping for the elite, the “wannabes,” centralize power
in managers, reduce both the power of deans and room for shared govern-
ance, and in doing so they downplay the community principles (Paradeise &
Thoenig, 2013; Tuchman, 2009). Comparative analysis displays a systematic
association between the strength of NPM pressures and the introduction of
managerial elements like hierarchy and rationality (Seeber et al., forthcom-
ing), but also that universities respond to the dilemma between central con-
trol and professional autonomy by combining formal and informal
mechanisms of control (Bleiklie, Enders, & Lepori, forthcoming).
METHODOLOGY
Sample
The sample of universities was purposefully constructed in order to
mirror some central dimensions of diversity in European universities, in
terms of age, size, international reputation, and disciplinary concentration.
Accordingly, the sample includes a rather heterogeneous set of universities
in terms of size (number of students ranges from 2,000 to 90,000), age
178 S. KUBRA CANHILAL ET AL.
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(foundation year between the middle-age and the late 1990s), international
reputation (some universities in the sample being among the first 100 in
international rankings, others not included at all) and finally, discipline
concentration, as the sample includes both generalist universities and highly
specialized technical universities. Moreover, the sample covers countries
which are very different in terms of their politico-administrative systems
(Bleiklie & Michelsen, 2013), as well as the strength and timing of the intro-
duction of NPM policies (Bleiklie, Enders, Lepori, & Musselin, 2011;
Paradeise et al., 2009).
The survey resulted in 687 respondents and a response rate of 48%. At the
university level, the number of respondents ranged from 7 to 55, with response
rates between 26% and 79%. In terms of the category of respondents, we col-
lected 246 questionnaires from senate members (response rate 45%), 235 from
middle managers (48%), 162 from board members (50%), 20 from central
administrators (74%), and 24 from rectors (89%). In terms of roles, the com-
position of our respondents is thus rather similar to the original population.
Constructs
In order to test our hypothesis, we use a survey delivered to people occupy-
ing five different roles in 26 European universities. These are: members of
the university board, members of the senates, rector or president, the per-
son responsible for infrastructure and management (the “central adminis-
trator”) and, finally, faculty deans. All survey questions were closed, most
of them using 5-point Likert scales, with the exception of some questions
which used a 3-point scale. Since not all questions were included in the
questionnaires given to all groups, the number of respondents varies
between questions (see Table 2 for all constructs and questions used).
Hierarchy
In order to analyze hierarchical structure, we used a survey question con-
cerning the actual level of decision-making power for 13 different items and
for three organizational levels inside universities (central level, faculty, and
shopfloor which refers to the academic heartland; Clark, 1998). This ques-
tion is suitable for our investigation because it deals with actual power and
not just with formal competences, and it provides a fine-grained view by a
large number of items. Moreover this question allows us to analyze the
decision-making power of each organizational level by looking at different
tasks (e.g., core and non-core academic and managerial tasks). Factor
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Table 2. Constructs Table.
Constructs Survey Question Scale Category
Respondents
Items N Alfa ICCa
H1: Hierarchy:
managerial
Please indicate the extent to which
actors within your university have
actual decision-making power for
the listed issues
3-point All Average score for 8
items by three
levels (central,
faculty,
leadership)
583 .715 .10
Max (leadership,
faculty)-shopfloor
.742 .12
.743 .07
H2: Hierarchy:
academic
Please indicate the extent to which
actors within your university have
actual decision-making power for
the listed issues
3-point All Average score for 5
items by three
levels (central,
faculty,
leadership)
580 .740 .13
Max (leadership,
faculty)-shopfloor
.712 .13
.742 .06
R1: Rule-based
allocation
How important is each of the following
factors in resource allocation to
units?
5 point Central
administrator,
senate, middle
management
3 items referring to
formula
allocation
434 .701 0.22
R2: Comparison
between units
For which of the following activities
does your university systematically
compare different units?
3 choices Central
administrator
and middle
management
Average score for 5
items
217 .850 0.11
R2: Evaluation of
individuals
For which of the following activities
does your university systematically
compare individuals
3 choices Central
administrator
and middle
management
Average score for 5
items
192 .807 0.15
P1: Participation in the
strategy
Importance of cooperation in realizing
the university strategy
5 point Rector, Central
administrator,
senate, board
Average score for 3
items
364 .768 0.06
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C1: Collegiality Do you agree with the following
statements concerning your
university?
5 point All 675 .594 0.05
PA1: Power of the
individual academics
(shopfloor) 
managerial tasks
Please indicate the extent to which
actors within your university have
actual decision-making power for
the listed issues
3-point All Average score for 8
items by three
levels (central,
faculty,
leadership)
583 743 .07
PA2: Power of the
individual academics
(shopfloor)
Please indicate the extent to which
actors within your university have
actual decision-making power for
the listed issues
3-point All Average score for 5
items by three
levels (central,
faculty,
leadership)
580 .742 .06
Academic tasks
aThe Intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) measures the proportion of variance between groups. Values below 0.10 are indicative of no
meaningful variations (Snijders & Bosker, 2012).
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analysis run separately on the three levels provides convergent results and
allows for the classification of items into two broad groups.
The first group includes the items related to the power concerning the
nomination of hierarchical positions and management issues: (1) selecting
leadership, (2) selecting the head of units, (3) setting the goals of units, (4)
defining the budget of units, (5) setting employment conditions for a new
chair, (6) setting rules and procedures for the evaluation of units, (7) defin-
ing policies for the management of academic staff, (8) setting study places
for each curriculum.
The second group includes the items related to teaching, research, and aca-
demic appointments: (1) establishing the profile of a new position, (2) selecting
the candidate for a new chair, (3) establishing new teaching programs, (4) eval-
uating individual academic performance, and (5) establishing research pro-
grams. Having these two groups allows us to measure hierarchy in terms of the
power of each organizational level for academic and managerial tasks. We con-
struct two measures of hierarchy as managerial hierarchy (see H1 in Table 2)
and academic hierarchy (see H2 in Table 2). In order to measure managerial
and academic hierarchy we construct it by taking the maximum between the
leadership level and the faculty level, and subtract it from the shopfloor level.
Rationality
To analyze rationality we use the questions related to the introduction of
rule systems. The first question is concerned with the use of criteria for the
internal allocation of resources. Three items refer to formula allocation
based on students, graduates, and external funding, which load onto a sin-
gle factor. We construct a variable for rule-based allocation (see R1 in
Table 2) as the average score for these three items.
The second question measures the two variables concerning whether the
university systematically compares its units, respectively, subunits and indi-
viduals, for five dimensions (teaching performance, teaching process,
research performance, research process, and non-academic affairs). The
five items for each of the two questions load onto a single factor in the fac-
tor analysis and display a high level of consistency. We construct two dis-
tinct variables, one variable for units and one variable for subunits and
individual comparisons (see R2 in Table 2).
Collegiality, Participation, and the Power of Individual Academics
In order to measure collegiality, we measure the decision-making power of
the shopfloor level (see PA1 and PA2 in Table 2). Therefore, we use the
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same question of hierarchy; however, we analyze the power of the shop-
floor. The question includes 13 items. Additionally, to measure participa-
tion, we use a question about cooperation with three items, regarding: (a)
the importance of cooperation and participation in the creation of the uni-
versities’ strategy; (b) the power of the individual academics (shopfloor
level) for managerial tasks like nomination of heads, and (c) power of indi-
viduals regarding budgets and employment conditions. While in a purely
collegial setting these tasks should be managed by academics as well, they
are not central to the notion of academic autonomy per se.
New Public Management Reform Pressures
In order to analyze the impact of NPM, a variable has been constructed
measuring the strength and duration of NPM policies on an indexed scale
from 0 to 1. Four main criteria were considered: timing, which measures
how long the NPM narrative has influenced the reform discourse in higher
education; competition considers the share of public funds allocated via
competitive streams of formula and projects; accountability is a proxy for
the relevance of teaching and research evaluations promoted by ministries
and agencies; autonomy is estimated by how leadership is selected
(appointed or elected), and what is the power of the university to reorga-
nize itself, for example, by changing the statute, creating new faculties or
courses (Paradeise et al., 2009). Table 3 provides the NPM scores of each
country involved in this study.
Data Analysis
First, we compare the means of the respondent’s answers inside each uni-
versity; since differences in responses by groups of respondents are non-sig-
nificant for most of the questions we use, this procedure is robust against
differences in the composition of the sample. We use a paired t-test in order
to compare whether observed differences in the average of university means
are statistically significant.
Secondly, in order to analyze the impact of NPM pressures on our vari-
ables, we perform multi-level analysis using as dependent variables the
scores for each individual respondent. Independent variables include the
level of NPM and organizational controls, as well as dummies for respon-
dent’s roles. Our model consists of responses from individuals within the
universities. We model individual scores as an outcome of both individual
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Table 3. Level of NPM Pressures.
Timing
of NPM
Reforms
Funding Accountability: Top-Down
Evaluation of HEIs Research
and Teaching Performancea
Autonomy: Leadership Selection,
Decision-Making on Organization
and Profilea
Overall
NPM
InfluenceShare of
formula in
core budgetb
Share of
projectb
Norway From
2000
(2)
45% (2) 20% (2) Evaluation system based on
reports produced by HEIs (2);
teaching program externally
evaluated (2)
Appointed leaders at faculty and
department Level (2); HEIs have
the right to decide on internal
organization (3)
0.45
Portugal From
2000
90% (2) 3% (1) Research evaluation and
assessment and accreditation
of HEIs and their study cycles
done by independent agencies
(2)
Mostly elected leaders (2). Power to
reorganize within the legal
framework, creation of courses
submitted to the accreditation
agency (2)
0.27
Italy From
2000
7% (1) 3% (1) Research assessment but limited
impact (1); central
accreditation (2)
Leaders elected by academics (1);
HEIs can reorganize, teaching
courses must satisfy law
requirement (2)
0.00
Germany From
2000
Federal
funding (2)
12% (2) excellenz initiative (2)
accreditation agencies (2)
Leaders can be appointed top-down;
most are still academics (1)
reorganization power limited (1)
0.18
France From
mid-
2000
(1)
Performance
contracts
(2)
30% (2) Recent establishment of
agencies for HEIs evaluation
(2); timid evaluation of
courses (1)
Leaders elected by academics (1),
reorganization power is limited,
although growing (2)
0.00
Switzerland From
2000
(2)
Federal
funding (2)
21% (2) No HEIs wide teaching or
research evaluation, which are
up to each HEI (1)
Rectors appointed but often limited
powers (2); some liberty to
reorganize but also strong state
intervention capability (2)
0.18
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UK From
1980s
(3)
59% (3) 29% (3) Research assessment exercise
with strong impact (3);
market-oriented accreditation
(2)
Strong university leadership
(appointed by board) and
autonomy to reorganize (3)
1.00
The
Netherlands
From
mid-
1980s
(3)
90% (3) 10% (2) Research evaluation for internal
allocation (2); central
accreditation (2)
Vertical system of appointment (3),
within given national boundaries
HEIs are free to reorganize (3)
0.82
For individual items we use a three-point scale 1= low; 2=medium; 3=high. Total score is calculated as the average of the four items,
rescaled from 1 (highest NPM influence) to 0 (lowest NPM influence).
aParadeise et al. (2009).
bShare of funding allocated via formula and project (Chinchilla-Rodrigue´z, Ferligoi, Miguel, Kronegger, & de Moya-Anego´n, 2012;
Lepori, Benninghoff, Jongbloed, Salerno, & Slipersaeter, 2005; Reale & Seeber, 2011).
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level and university level variables. We treat the responses as continuous
and use OLS. We calculate it as:
yij = β1þ β2xiþ β3xjþ ui þ ɛij
More specifically, we use j as the respondent and i as the university, and
ui as the observations at the individual level within the same university. We
use this variable because these observations are not independent.
In terms of organizational controls, we use the level of disciplinary concentra-
tion, which is calculated by the Herfindahl index of the share of students
enrolled in each of the nine subject domains of educational statistics. Size is
measured through the number of students at the concerned university. Size is
relevant since smaller organizations might be easier to manage through infor-
mal processes and thus display a lower level of formal hierarchy and rationality.
Age is measured by the foundation year of the university. Finally, an indicator
of international reputation has been derived from the Scimago Ranking (2011),
the most complete world ranking in terms of organizational coverage that
includes more than 1,000 Western European research organizations.
RESULTS
Descriptive Analysis
The results are consistent with our expectations that variations IN the man-
agerial logic characteristics are higher than the variations IN the academic
logic’s characteristics, such as participation and collegiality with respect to
rationality and hierarchy. When analyzing the measure of involvement of
academics and of the collegial nature of the university, a noteworthy fea-
ture is that these characteristics are more uniform across the whole sample
than those of hierarchy and rationality. The same applies for the intraclass
correlation coefficient, showing that less than 6% of the responses’ variance
is at the university level. The only other indicators displaying such limited
variation between universities, are those of shopfloor power, which can be
largely interpreted as a similar measure of the involvement of academics in
decision-making. This supports the assumption that the involvement of
academics represents a common feature of the universities considered,
which is rather uniform and less influenced by differences in national poli-
cies, as well as in the extent of NPM pressures.
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With regard to the relationship among the variables, the results confirm
our expectations. Fig. 2 demonstrates that rationality in resource allocation
is higher than rationality when comparing units and individuals, respec-
tively; furthermore, resource allocation is more formal than evaluating
units and individuals, therefore, it is more applicable. More specifically,
evaluating individual academics is quite contrary to the academic logic,
therefore, it is not surprising to see that it has the lowest score among the
other aspects of rationality. In the case of hierarchy, the results show that
hierarchy for managerial tasks is higher than the hierarchy for academic
tasks, which was also expected with the introduction of NPM reforms.
Lastly, the data reveal that the power of individual academics is higher in
academic tasks than in management tasks. Therefore, competing logics do
not require compliance for all their stipulations and do not oppose each
other concerning all organizational activities (Greenwood et al., 2009; Jay,
2013). Descriptive statistics concerning the differences are statistically signifi-
cant (t-test on paired samples, p < 0.001). However, the difference between
units and individuals cannot be confirmed, as it is only marginally significant
(Table 4).
Impact of NPM
In order to analyze the impact of NPM, we ran multi-level analysis (see
Table 5). Accordingly, we tentatively conclude that there is no impact of
NPM on collegiality and participation (see Table 5 for the results of the
regression). In our models, the effect of NPM on the indicators we have
presented in order to measure academic logic; collegiality, participation,
Table 4. Paired Sample T-test Results.
Paired Differences t df Significance
(Two-Tailed)
M SD SEM
Rationality formula-based allocation .13065 .14373 .02819 4.635 25 .000
Rationality comparison between units
Rationality comparison between units .04016 .11513 .02303 1.744 24 .094
Rationality evaluation of individuals
Hierarchy managerial .23501 .11727 .02300 10.219 25 .000
Hierarchy academic
Power academic shopfloor power .22936 .10780 .02114 10.849 25 .000
Power management shopfloor
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and power of individual academics are found to be non-significant. This is
an important finding since the demise of collegiality is often assumed in the
literature that is critical of new public management. This also supports the
insight that the involvement of academics represents a common feature of
the universities considered, which is rather uniform and less influenced by
differences in national policies, as well as in the extent of NPM pressures.
On the other hand, the results reveal that NPM coefficients are fairly large
and highly significant for hierarchy in managerial tasks as well as the vari-
ables within rationality (formula-based allocation, comparison between
units and individuals) (Fig. 3).
We also run a multi-level regression separately for each dimension
related to managerial logic. A stronger NPM (i.e., value of 1, correspond-
ing to the level of the United Kingdom) generates a clear increase in the
level of hierarchy and rationality, but in a way that is compatible with
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Fig. 2. Boxplots of Means of Responses Inside Individual Universities, N = 26.
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Table 5. Multi-Level Regression Results.
Response Hman_Full S.E. Hacad_Full S.E. R1_Full S.E. R2_Full S.E. R3_Full S.E. P_Full S.E. C_Full S.E. Sfac_Full S.E. Sf_Manfu S.E.
Hierarchy
managerial
Hierarchy
academic
Rationality
formula-
based
allocation
Rationali ty
comparison between
units
Rationali ty
evaluation of
individuals
Participation Collegial Power_
academic
Power_
management
Fixed part
Cons 0.478 0.286 0.053 0.35 0.859*** 0.195 −0.274 0.312 0.739* 0.319 0.692* 0.202 0.611*** 0.127 0.609* 0.301 0.173 0.171
NPM 0.239*** 0.054 0.171** 0.067 0.295*** 0.037 0.212** 0.066 0.339*** 0.069 0.036 0.039 −0.025 0.024 −0.002 0.057 −0.155 0.035
Disciplinary conc. −0.133 0.084 −0.082 0.104 0.127* 0.053 0.122 0.1 0.124 0.106 0.103 0.059 0.07 0.038 0.126 0.088 0.131** 0.053
Size −0.002† 0.001 −0.002 0.002 −0.001 0.001 0.004** 0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 · 0.001 0 0.001 0.001 0.001
Age −0.032 0.108 0.009 0.131 −0.072 0.073 0.287* 0.118 −0.105 0.119 −0.045 0.076 −0.02 0.047 −0.036 0.114 0.066 0.062
Int. reputation 0.029 0.079 0.079 0.096 −0.167** 0.054 0.027 0.09 −0.168 0.095 −0.032 0.057 0.053 0.035 −0.014 0.082 −0.006 0.05
Rector 0.006 0.055 0.003 0.07 . . . . . . . . 0.116*** 0.032 −0.029 0.056 0.027 0.047
Central
administrator
−0.032 0.062 −0.017 0.079 0.046 0.043 0.095 0.062 . . −0.004 0.045 0.068 0.036 0.014 0.063 0.102 0.053
Senator 0.004 0.031 0.063 0.039 0.017 0.02 . . . . . 0.023 −0.022 0.016 −0.054 0.031 0.009 0.025
Board member 0.054 0.035 0.13** 0.044 . . . . . . . . 0.011 0.018 −0.076** 0.035 0.004 0.029
Random part
Level: institution
Cons/cons 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0 0 0.004 0.002 0 0.001
Level: caseID
Cons/cons 0.073 0.005 0.118 0.007 0.036 0.003 0.07 0.007 0.064 0 0.038 0.003 0.026 0.001 0.074 0.005 0.053 0.003
−2*loglikelihood
empty model
157,655
−2*loglikelihood: 131,474 391,383 −199,199 38,657 17,454 −154,979 −542,283 −26,951 155,586
DIC:
pD:
Units: institution 26 26 26 26 25 26 26 26 26
Units: caseID 538 539 434 217 192 364 675 540 538
***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, †<0.1, df = N− 1− (variables).
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the academic logic, since participation and collegiality are not affected. In
the following section, we discuss the implication of our findings.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we show the effect of the NPM-inspired reforms on
European universities by focusing on hierarchy and rationality from man-
agerial logic and participation and collegiality from academic logic. We do
so by looking at different tasks as well as different working groups in a uni-
versity in order to be able to construct our measures. Our results provide a
nuanced understanding of responses of public universities to managerial
pressures enforced through NPM policies. On the one hand, we found evi-
dence that NPM is associated with the introduction of hierarchy and
rationality inside the case universities  more specifically, a stronger NPM
pressure is correlated with a steeper hierarchy and differences in the level of
power between leaders as foreseen by the managerial logic. The type of
measures used, which refer directly to decision-making and power rather
than to formal structure, makes it unlikely that these responses are purely
ritualistic in nature (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). On the other hand, we also
found that compliance is highly selective and strongly influenced by the
presence and characteristics of the academic logic, like the participation of
academics in decision-making processes; as there seems to be no significant
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Fig. 3. The Impact of NPM.
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association with NPM pressures. Thus, we found evidence of the phenom-
enon of compartmentalization (Pache & Santos, 2013).
These results are consistent with institutional theory, and particu-
larly recent work on organizational responses to institutional pluralism
(Kraatz & Block, 2008). When subject to conflicting institutional pres-
sures, universities will try to find ways to simultaneously comply with
managerial pressures and with the academic logic by developing highly
differentiated responses according to the type of tasks. This way, this
paper also contributes to the growing literature on hybridization and the
co-existence of logics within the organizations (Battilana & Dorado,
2010; Jay, 2013).
Consequently, we would like to highlight two implications of our find-
ings in the context of a better understanding of organizational change pro-
cesses within public organizations as well as when it comes to the design of
public policies. The empirical findings support previous studies suggesting
that, under increasing NPM pressures, public organizations are indeed
moving towards managed and more complete organizations and introdu-
cing some managerial element of hierarchy and rationality (Seeber et al.,
forthcoming). At the same time, the data show that this does not necessa-
rily imply moving towards the corporate model of organizations, but rather
moving in the direction of models found in other professional and knowl-
edge-intensive organizations, like soft bureaucracies (Courpasson, 2000) or
“enabling bureaucracies” (Adler & Borys, 1996). However, in certain cases,
the emergence of an enabling bureaucracy does not occur for all the organi-
zations. In certain cases, there are some individual universities in which the
introduction of rationalization has been accompanied by stronger negative
perceptions, arguably because the approach was less consensual (Ramirez,
2006). This might point to an interesting venue for future research, that is,
under what ideal conditions do more hierarchy and rationality result into
the development of an enabling bureaucracy. Importantly, the presence of
a strong academic logic was central to this process and, accordingly, we
might argue that it plays a key role in maintaining some characteristics of
the professional work when introducing managerialism and in avoiding
some of the most negative consequences of NPM reforms, like demotiva-
tion of workers, weakening of trust, and loss of flexibility and autonomy.
In turn, this would suggest that public authorities should not consider pro-
fessional logics as opponents to managerial reforms, which should be
curbed. These should rather be considered as useful counterbalances that
help to avoid the negative consequences of managerialism by taking into
account the specific characteristics of the field.
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